AEI - Short Publications has the goods on The Paper Trail.
Most dramatically, an Iraqi intelligence report, apparently written in early 1997, describes Iraqi efforts to establish ties with various elements in the Saudi opposition, including Osama bin Ladin. Until 1996, the Saudi renegade was based in Sudan, then ruled by Hassan Turabi's National Islamic Front. One of Iraq's few allies, Sudan served as an intermediary between Baghdad and bin Ladin, as well as other Islamic radicals. On Feb. 19, 1995, an Iraqi intelligence agent met with bin Ladin in Khartoum. Bin Ladin asked for two things: to carry out joint operations against foreign forces in Saudi Arabia and to broadcast the speeches of a radical Saudi cleric. Iraq agreed to the latter, but apparently not the former, at least as far as the author of this report knew. Notably, the report also states, "we are working at the present time to activate this relationship through new channels."
This guts the idea that Saddam and al-Qaeda hated each other and would never cooperate. Again, these are anecdotal examples and cannot be extrapolated to the whole picture. There are millions of pages of documents and only after careful review of a great many of them will any conclusions be possible. Even then, they might not be. We may still be arguing what the state of affairs was ten years from now. This is exactly the nature of intelligence. It is not a profession that allows for "proof" only guesses. Sometimes (often, in fact) those guesses are wrong. You are often given contradictory information and must decide which to believe.
Most dramatically, an Iraqi intelligence report, apparently written in early 1997, describes Iraqi efforts to establish ties with various elements in the Saudi opposition, including Osama bin Ladin. Until 1996, the Saudi renegade was based in Sudan, then ruled by Hassan Turabi's National Islamic Front. One of Iraq's few allies, Sudan served as an intermediary between Baghdad and bin Ladin, as well as other Islamic radicals. On Feb. 19, 1995, an Iraqi intelligence agent met with bin Ladin in Khartoum. Bin Ladin asked for two things: to carry out joint operations against foreign forces in Saudi Arabia and to broadcast the speeches of a radical Saudi cleric. Iraq agreed to the latter, but apparently not the former, at least as far as the author of this report knew. Notably, the report also states, "we are working at the present time to activate this relationship through new channels."
This guts the idea that Saddam and al-Qaeda hated each other and would never cooperate. Again, these are anecdotal examples and cannot be extrapolated to the whole picture. There are millions of pages of documents and only after careful review of a great many of them will any conclusions be possible. Even then, they might not be. We may still be arguing what the state of affairs was ten years from now. This is exactly the nature of intelligence. It is not a profession that allows for "proof" only guesses. Sometimes (often, in fact) those guesses are wrong. You are often given contradictory information and must decide which to believe.
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