Rummy's parting shot

The New York Times continuing it's role as information service for our enemies, publishes another classified memo. This time from Rummy.


SUBJECT: Iraq — Illustrative New Courses of Action

The situation in Iraq has been evolving, and U.S. forces have adjusted, over time, from major combat operations to counterterrorism, to counterinsurgency, to dealing with death squads and sectarian violence. In my view it is time for a major adjustment. Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough. Following is a range of options:



First: Now, now we're ready for a major adjustment? What the hell have you been doing if you knew we needed a change? You Sir, are driving the bus on this one. If we're off course, blame your boss and quit or look in the mirror and figure out a way to fix it.



ILLUSTRATIVE OPTIONS

Above the Line: (Many of these options could and, in a number of cases, should be done in combination with others)

¶Publicly announce a set of benchmarks agreed to by the Iraqi Government and the U.S. — political, economic and security goals — to chart a path ahead for the Iraqi government and Iraqi people (to get them moving) and for the U.S. public (to reassure them that progress can and is being made).



Welcome to the club. It's called "Everyone". We meet at the bar after work on Fridays.


¶Significantly increase U.S. trainers and embeds, and transfer more U.S. equipment to Iraqi Security forces (ISF), to further accelerate their capabilities by refocusing the assignment of some significant portion of the U.S. troops currently in Iraq.

¶Initiate a reverse embeds program, like the Korean Katusas, by putting one or more Iraqi soldiers with every U.S. and possibly Coalition squad, to improve our units’ language capabilities and cultural awareness and to give the Iraqis experience and training with professional U.S. troops.



In my view, the reverse embedding would be far more illustrative and have far better gains than the other way around. It's much easier for a dozen people to teach one by example than the other way around.


¶Aggressively beef up the Iraqi MOD and MOI, and other Iraqi ministries critical to the success of the ISF — the Iraqi Ministries of Finance, Planning, Health, Criminal Justice, Prisons, etc. — by reaching out to U.S. military retirees and Reserve/National Guard volunteers (i.e., give up on trying to get other USG Departments to do it.)


How about civilian volunteers? Create some sort of program with incentives to get Finance and Health professionals to go over to Iraq and help get this thing rolling. Do not require a 4 year committment. You'll never get some guy from Goldman to go over there for a 4 year stint. Make it a year.


¶Conduct an accelerated draw-down of U.S. bases. We have already reduced from 110 to 55 bases. Plan to get down to 10 to 15 bases by April 2007, and to 5 bases by July 2007.


The Tripwire scenario. See Korea, North. This doesn't work when you're fighting asymetrically.


¶Retain high-end SOF capability and necessary support structure to target Al Qaeda, death squads, and Iranians in Iraq, while drawing down all other Coalition forces, except those necessary to provide certain key enablers for the ISF.


Force multipliers remain in place. All respect to the Green Beanies, they do this and they'll be there forever. (Not that they'd mind so much).


¶Initiate an approach where U.S. forces provide security only for those provinces or cities that openly request U.S. help and that actively cooperate, with the stipulation being that unless they cooperate fully, U.S. forces would leave their province.

¶Stop rewarding bad behavior, as was done in Fallujah when they pushed in reconstruction funds, and start rewarding good behavior. Put our reconstruction efforts in those parts of Iraq that are behaving, and invest and create havens of opportunity to reward them for their good behavior. As the old saying goes, “If you want more of something, reward it; if you want less of something, penalize it.” No more reconstruction assistance in areas where there is violence.


This is inspired and should have been done at the outset. You shoot at us/attack us with IED's and the funds dry up. You play ball and we build you things. Carrot and stick are the oldest tools in the box. Use them.


¶Position substantial U.S. forces near the Iranian and Syrian borders to reduce infiltration and, importantly, reduce Iranian influence on the Iraqi Government.


Right, because nobody's been clamoring about this for years or anything.


¶Withdraw U.S. forces from vulnerable positions — cities, patrolling, etc. — and move U.S. forces to a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) status, operating from within Iraq and Kuwait, to be available when Iraqi security forces need assistance.

¶Begin modest withdrawals of U.S. and Coalition forces (start “taking our hand off the bicycle seat”), so Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up and take responsibility for their country.


I think this has been what's been happening now. Patrols have been reduced and we're staying more and more inside the green zone. Some speculate that's the reason for the uptick in Iraqi on Iraqi violence.


¶Provide money to key political and religious leaders (as Saddam Hussein did), to get them to help us get through this difficult period.


Translation: naked bribery.


¶Initiate a massive program for unemployed youth. It would have to be run by U.S. forces, since no other organization could do it.


Call it Iraqicorp and pull Bill Clinton as the head guy program manager (I had to redact that unintentional pun). This sounds like a big a waste of money as anything else we're doing.


¶Announce that whatever new approach the U.S. decides on, the U.S. is doing so on a trial basis. This will give us the ability to readjust and move to another course, if necessary, and therefore not “lose.”


Only problem is that any change in tactics or strategery leads to finger pointing and partisan point scoring by Democrats.


Below the Line (less attractive options):

¶Continue on the current path.


NNNNNOOOOOOOOOOooooooooooooooo


¶Move a large fraction of all U.S. Forces into Baghdad to attempt to control it.

¶Increase Brigade Combat Teams and U.S. forces in Iraq substantially.


This is the Go Big scenario. I'm not sure this would work long term. It would likely be some short term gains but the casualty rate would likely rise dramatically.


¶Set a firm withdrawal date to leave. Declare that with Saddam gone and Iraq a sovereign nation, the Iraqi people can govern themselves. Tell Iran and Syria to stay out.


Why not move our bases to the borders? We could secure them and let the Iraqis sort out what's going on in there now. Stem the flow of weapons and fighters and you have big gains.


¶Assist in accelerating an aggressive federalism plan, moving towards three separate states — Sunni, Shia, and Kurd.


I've been a fan of this one for 2 years now. Kurdistan is functioning on its own and doing very well. Emulate that in the south with the Shia and give the Sunnis something in the middle. Everyone gets a bite of the oil and the sectarianism abates as everybody has a safe haven. Downside: Turkey goes bonkers over independent Kurdistan and the Shia south might be overly friendly to Iran than we'd like.


¶Try a Dayton-like process.


Yeah, because that worked so well.

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